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Motivation for this study:
Even though people seem to be very 
concerned about privacy violations, they 
reveal a lot of private information, 
especially on the internet.
Example: online social networks
Another example:
Spiekermann, Grossklags and Berendt 
(2001) conducted an experiment on 
people’s privacy concerns and attitudes 
in the context of online shopping. They 
find that even the most privacy-aware 
and concerned subjects reveal a lot of 
private information, regardless of its 
relevance with respect to the product 
being bought. Quite daunting result, 
especially considering that in this study 
people were asked to sign a consent 
form allowing for their data to be sold 
to an unspecified third party.
The Pew Internet & American Life Project 
published a survey in April 2007 (Pew 
Internet & American Life Project, 2007) 
about the use of online social networks 
by teenagers and, among their results, 
they report that:
• 82% of surveyed profile creators posted 
their first name online and 29% also 
posted their last name (11% on publicly 
accessible profiles);
• 79% included pictures of themselves;
• 61% published the name of their city or 
town;
• 29% posted their email address and 2% 
added a mobile number.
Several possible explanations for this 
inconsistency:
• Trust: People could perceive an online 
social network like Facebook “as a closed, 
trusted, and trustworthy community” 
(Acquisti & Gross, 2006). This perception 
will then fuel their  willingness to reveal 
private information.
•  Underweighting of small probabilities: 
One of the most serious risks that one 
runs when he/she reveals private 
information is identity theft. Even though 
this crime is becoming more and more 
common over the years, the FTC 
estimates that about 3 to 4.5% of the US 
population is victim of identity theft each 
year: a relatively small proportion. One 
reason why people in general are willing 
to reveal so much private information 
could be that they underweight the 
probability of becoming a victim and they 
might think that it will never happen to 
them. Risk (mis)perceptions are the base 
of prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979).
 
•Hyperbolic time discounting: People 
are rational economic agents and, when 
facing decisions regarding protection of 
their privacy online, they compare the 
costs and benefits of revelation of private 
information. Their “mistake” consists in 
underweighting the costs of revelation, 
costs that are typically further away in 
the future, relative to the corresponding 
immediate benefits. This is due to the fact 
that the discount rate that people use in 
their analyses is not constant, but 
declines over time. Therefore, a perfectly 
rational individual, who strongly values 
privacy, might end up revealing more 
information than it would be optimal for 
him because of self-control problems and 
time-inconsistencies in his optimizing 
behavior: what appears to be the best 
action now may not be the best action 
once the time of taking it actually arrives 
(Acquisti, 2004).
Illusion of control in the context of 
privacy in online social networks:
• belief that revelation of private 
information implies control over access 
and use  of that information by third 
parties.
The argument of this study is that, even 
after the individual makes this 
information about himself accessible by 
the members of the community (or even 
to the larger universe of internet users), 
he suffers from an illusion of control 
upon it. Even though he is perfectly 
aware that the information he posts on 
his profile becomes available to his 
friends (or to everyone on the internet), 
he unconsciously assumes nobody will 
use it without his authorization. On the 
other hand, if a third party is responsible 
for the revelation of the same 
information that the individual would be 
ready to share on the network, he may 
feel a loss of control and realize that 
once private information is made public 
(for instance, published online) not only 
can it be accessed, but also used by 
others.
One further possible explanation for this 
seemingly irrational behavior is
ILLUSION OF CONTROL:
the attitude of people to “behave as 
though chance events are subject to 
control” (Langer, 1975). People don’t 
seem to be good at distinguishing cases 
where skill is necessary for success from 
instances where success relies exclusively 
on chance.
Examples: 
•dice: it’s been observed that, when 
rolling dice in craps, people tend to throw 
 harder if they want high numbers.
 
•experiment: under some circumstances, 
experimental subjects have been induced 
to believe that they could affect the 
outcome of a purely random coin toss. 
Subjects who guessed a series of coin 
tosses more successfully began to believe 
that they were actually better guessers, 
and believed that their guessing 
performance would be less accurate if 
they were distracted (Langer & Roth, 
1975).
Experimental design
In order to test for illusion of control in 
the context of privacy in online social 
networks, we will run three experiments.
• Recruitment: We will recruit students 
from two different Universities, one in 
the USA and one in Italy, and ask them to 
take a 5 minute survey about their life on 
and off campus. They will be told that the 
study is about the creation of a new 
University networking website.
• Content: The questions are the same 
across the 3 experiments and include 
open-ended, multiple choice and rating 
questions. Some of them request for 
personally identifiable information, 
others are privacy-intrusive, others are 
not. There are no compulsory fields and 
participants are explicitly told that they 
can skip as many questions as they want.
• Model: Across the various studies, the 
dependent variable of interest is, 
primarily, whether the subject decides to 
answer the questions, and in particular 
whether she answers the more privacy-
intrusive questions.
First experiment:
Participants are randomly assigned to one 
of two conditions:
• first condition: they are told that none 
of the questions requires an answer, but 
the answers that they decide to provide 
will appear as part of a profile that will be 
automatically created for them and 
posted on the new university networking 
website, accessible to members of their 
University only (students, faculty, staff);
• second condition: for each question 
they are also explicitly asked whether 
they want their answer to appear on their 
profile or not. Notice that in this last 
condition they are endowed with more 
control over the publication of their 
private information, not over access to 
and use of that information by others.
• Expected results: more information in 
the latter condition would be a strong 
piece of evidence that revelation of 
private information is really a matter of 
control over the publication of that 
information.
Second Experiment:
Again, subjects are randomized in two 
groups and assigned to one of two 
conditions:
• first condition: identical to the first 
condition in the previous experiment, so 
participants are told that none of the 
questions requires an answer, but the 
answers that they decide to provide will 
appear as part of their profile on the 
university networking website, accessible 
to members of their University only 
(students, faculty, staff).
• second condition: they are told that a 
random subset (50%) of the answers 
provided will be posted as part of their 
profile.
• Expected results: if our hypothesis is 
correct, people may be willing to reveal 
more in the first condition, where there is 
no random outcome, despite the fact that 
the amount of information published 
online will certainly be lower in the 
second condition.
Third experiment:
This last experiment has a 2x2 design, 
meaning that we manipulate both the 
control that subjects have over the 
publication of private information and the 
accessibility of their profile by others, 
resulting in 4 conditions in total.
• first condition: they will read that none 
of the questions is mandatory but that all 
the answers provided will be part of their 
online profile, which will only be 
accessible by members of their 
University;
• second condition: we vary the control 
dimension telling subjects that a random 
(50%) subset of the answers provided will 
be posted online, but we leave the 
accessibility dimension unaltered (the 
profile will still be accessible by members 
of their University only);
• third condition: all the answers provided 
will be part of the online profile, which 
will be accessible by members of the 
subjects’ University and of nearby 
Universities;
• fourth condition: subjects will be told 
that a random (50%) subset of the 
answers provided will be published and 
that their profile will be accessible by 
members of their own University and of 
nearby Universities.
• Expected results: if subjects were not 
responding to the accessibility 
manipulation, they would be strongly 
suggesting “irrationality” in their decision 
of publication of private information, 
reinforcing our hypothesis that other 
psychological mechanisms and heuristics, 
rather than classical rationality, guide 
people’s online privacy decision making. 
-I've never looked through a keyhole without finding someone was looking back.
-- Judy Garland, actress --
-Relying on the government to protect your privacy is like asking a peeping tom to install your 
window blinds.
-- John Perry Barlow, founder of the Electronic Frontier Foundation --
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